Using state Youth Risk Behavior Survey data for the period 1995-2011, we examine the relationship between state cigarette taxes and how high school students obtain their cigarettes. Our estimates suggest that, among respondents under age 18, higher cigarette taxes reduce smoking participation primarily through thirdparty purchases, an important component of the secondary market. We also fi nd that, among respondents age 18 and older, cigarette taxes are negatively related to purchasing cigarettes directly from a commercial establishment. Finally, we fi nd that cigarette taxes are essentially unrelated to borrowing. JEL Codes: I10, I12
The primary goal of this study is to look inside this black box by exploring the relationship between cigarette taxes and how youths obtain cigarettes. Specifi cally, we use data on high school students from state Youth Risk Behavior Surveys (YRBS) for the period 1995-2011 to estimate whether cigarette taxes reduce smoking participation through the secondary market, the formal market, or some combination of both.
To our knowledge, only one previous study has explored the relationship between taxes and how youths obtain cigarettes. Katzman, Markowitz, and McGeary (2007) found that state excise taxes were negatively related to cigarette purchases but had little impact on borrowing or "bumming" cigarettes, interchangeable terms used to describe the "elaborate negotiations of exchange" many young smokers use to obtain cigarettes without the formal outlay of cash (Whitesel and Shuman, 2009, p. 336) . However, Katzman, Markowitz, and McGeary (2007) examined data from only four national YRBS surveys (1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001) conducted during a period when there was limited within-state variation in cigarette taxes. As a consequence, they were forced to rely on cross-state variation for identifi cation, and their estimates, although intriguing, could refl ect diffi cult-to-measure factors at the state level such as anti-smoking sentiment. Because we have more observations per state-year than were available to Katzman, Markowitz, and McGeary (2007) , and because cigarette tax increases were larger in the 2000s than during the mid-to-late 1990s (Carpenter and Cook, 2008; Lillard, Molloy, and Sfekas, 2013) , we are able to account for unobserved heterogeneity by including state fi xed effects and state-specifi c linear time trends.
Our results confi rm that there was a negative relationship between cigarette taxes and youth smoking participation during the period under study. Multinomial logit estimates suggest that, among high school students under age 18, cigarette taxes principally infl uence smoking participation through third-party purchases, an important component of the secondary market. In addition, we fi nd that cigarette taxes are negatively related to the probability that high school students age 18 years and older obtain cigarettes directly from a commercial establishment. Although taxes are negatively related to the probability of borrowing cigarettes when we do not include state fi xed effects, estimates of the relationship between taxes and borrowing are not robust to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the state level.
II. BACKGROUND
Under perfect competition with constant marginal costs, excise taxes are passed through at a rate of 100 percent -in other words, a one dollar increase in the tax leads to a one dollar increase in the price paid by the typical consumer. However, under imperfect competition, both under-and over-shifting of taxes are possible (Besley, 1989) . Because the secondary market for cigarettes could, in theory, be more or less competitive than the formal market, high-school students who rely on friends, family members, and schoolmates for cigarettes could be subject to a different tax pass-through than those who purchase cigarettes from commercial establishments. 1 Whether they respond to an increase in the cigarette tax by switching from one market to the other or by quitting altogether is an open question. 2 Katzman, Markowitz, and McGeary (2007) hypothesized that higher taxes would increase the incentive to borrow cigarettes from friends rather than purchase them. Using data from the national YRBS for the period 1995-2001, they found that taxes were negatively related to the probability of purchasing cigarettes, but had little impact on borrowing. This result is in keeping with the argument that the secondary market insulates teenagers from anti-smoking policies (Friend et al., 2001; Ribisl, 2003) . However, there is reason to view it with some degree of skepticism. When Katzman, Markowitz, and McGeary (2007) attempted to account for the potential endogeneity of prices and taxes by including state fi xed effects, they discovered that the inclusion of state fi xed effects in conjunction with the time fi xed effects eliminated much of the independent variation in cigarette prices. As a consequence, they relied on cross-state variation for identifi cation and could not control for diffi cult-to-measure factors at the state level such as anti-smoking sentiment. There is evidence that the cross-state relationship between taxes and youth smoking participation is, to a large extent, driven by anti-smoking sentiment .
Below, we estimate a multinomial logistic model with state and year fi xed effects. Estimation of this model is aided by the fact that state YRBS data often contain more observations per state-year than do the national YRBS data. It is also aided by the fact that all but three states increased their per-pack cigarette tax sometime after 2000. These tax increases allow us to introduce state fi xed effects without losing as much identifying variation as did Katzman, Markowitz, and McGeary (2007) . 3
III. DATA AND MEASURES
We draw on state YRBS data at the individual level for the period 1995-2011. The state versions of the YRBS are school-based, and contain many of the same questions as 1 Consistent with the hypothesis that the cigarette market is not perfectly competitive, a number of studies have found that cigarette taxes are over-shifted (Keeler et al., 1996; Hanson and Sullivan, 2009; . In contrast, Harding, Leibtag and Lovenheim (2012) found that cigarette taxes are passed through at a rate of less than 100 percent, and Espinosa and Evans (forthcoming) found that cigarette taxes are passed through at a 100 percent rate. 2 DeCicca, Kenkel, and Liu (2010) estimated a pass-through rate of 0.26 for individuals who went out of state to purchase cigarettes by the carton. Although a suffi ciently large tax increase could encourage some teenagers to go out of state, those too young to drive would presumably be forced to pay a larger portion of the increase or quit smoking. Carpenter and Cook (2008) noted that an increase in taxes could be related indirectly to youth smoking behavior through effects on smoking rates in their social environment. Higher taxes could, for instance, negatively impact borrowing if friends quit smoking as it becomes more expensive. 3 When Katzman, Markowitz and McGeary (2007) regressed cigarette taxes on a set of state and time dummies, they obtained an R 2 of 0.87. Running the same regression using state YRBS data for the period 1995-2011 produced an R 2 of 0.82. the national YRBS. They are coordinated by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and are typically administered by state health departments to high school students every other year. A total of 35 states conducted at least two surveys during the period 1995-2011 that asked questions with regard to how respondents usually obtained their cigarettes, and gave the CDC permission to distribute their data or were willing to provide their data directly to us. Among the 35 states that contributed data to the analysis, all but two (Missouri and North Dakota) increased their nominal cigarette tax at least once during the period under study; 24 increased their nominal cigarette tax more than once. 4 Previous studies have used national YRBS data to examine the relationship between cigarette taxes and youth smoking participation (Gruber and Zinman, 2001; Bishai, Mercer, and Tapales, 2005; Carpenter and Cook, 2008) . To our knowledge, the only previous study in this area to use state YRBS data is by Carpenter and Cook (2008) . These authors, however, did not have access to information at the individual level from the state surveys. The principal advantage of using state, as opposed to national, YRBS data is that it provides thousands of observations per state-year. 5 In contrast, the national YRBS typically interviews hundreds, and occasionally only dozens, of individuals from a particular state, posing an obstacle to obtaining consistent parameter estimates from a non-linear model such as a multinomial logit. In their seminal work, Neyman and Scott (1948) showed that estimating non-linear models with limited data can result in problems with incidental parameters, raising both theoretical and computational concerns.
There are, however, at least two disadvantages to using the state YRBS data. First, like the national YRBS, the state YRBS are school-based. If dropouts respond differently to cigarette prices than enrolled students, then our estimates may not be as informative as estimates that use data from broader surveys (DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios, 2002) . Second, the state YRBS are not designed to be nationally representative. However, comparing the information contained in state surveys with information from the national YRBS can help gauge the severity of any potential bias. Table 1A shows the prevalence of smoking among state YRBS respondents for the period 1995-2011. In addition, it shows the prevalence of frequent smoking (defi ned as having smoked on 20 of the past 30 days) and smoking every day. 6 Of the respondents in our sample, 23 percent smoked at least once in the past 30 days, 11 percent were frequent smokers, and almost 10 percent smoked every day. Despite the fact that the state YRBS data are not designed to be nationally representative, these fi gures are similar to those obtained using weighted data from the national YRBS for the same period (Table 1B) . A comparison of smoking participation trends among state YRBS respondents to smoking participation trends based on weighted national YRBS data 4 Appendix Table A1 shows nominal cigarette taxes by state and year for those states that contributed data to the analysis. For more information on the state YRBS data collection effort, see http://www.cdc.gov/ HealthyYouth/yrbs/index.htm. 5 The typical state contributing data to our analysis conducted six YRBS surveys during the period 1995-2011.
Conditional on having conducted a survey, the average number of observations per state-year was 2,427. Importantly, no state contributed fewer than 1,000 observations from any given survey and large states such as Florida, New York, and Texas interviewed between 3,000 and 9,000 students per year. A table showing the number of state YRBS respondents by year and state is available from the authors upon request. 6 This is the same defi nition of frequent smoking used by Carpenter and Cook (2008) .
suggests that the state and national surveys captured the same broad changes in preferences and responses to policy ( Figure 1 ).
In addition to asking how many cigarettes were consumed in the past 30 days, state and national YRBS respondents were asked about how they obtained their cigarettes. Specifi cally, they were asked: "[d]uring the past 30 days, how did you usually get your own cigarettes?" The possible answers were:
1. Did not smoke cigarettes in the past 30 days.
2. I bought them in a store such as a convenience store, supermarket, discount store, or gas station.
I bought them from a vending machine.
4. I gave someone else money to buy them for me.
5. I borrowed (or bummed) them from someone else.
6.
A person 18 years old or older gave them to me. 7. I took them from a store/family member.
8. I got them some other way. By combining responses 2 and 3 above, and combining responses 4, 5, and 6, we created four outcomes: Formal, Secondary, Took, and Other. Table 1C presents means for these outcomes. Figure 2 presents evidence that an increasingly large proportion of young smokers came to rely on the secondary market during a period when state cigarette taxes rose sharply. In 1995, more than 40 percent of state YRBS respondents who smoked obtained their cigarettes through direct purchase from a commercial establishment or a vending machine; by 2011, only 24 percent obtained their cigarettes on the formal market. Over the same period, giving someone else money to buy them (i.e., third-party purchase) and borrowing increased in relative importance. In 1995, 47 percent of state YRBS respondents who smoked obtained their cigarettes through borrowing or third-party purchase; by 2011, 59 percent obtained their cigarettes from these sources. Reliance on other methods to obtain cigarettes also increased during the 1995-2011 period, perhaps due to internet sales (on which the state tax is effectively zero). 7 
Figure 1
Smoking Participation 7 According to Goolsbee, Lovenheim, and Slemrod (2010, p.135) , although legally required to pay state cigarette taxes, online buyers rarely comply with this requirement. Data on the volume of online cigarette sales are nonexistent, but "
[v]irtually all expert observers agree...that online cigarette sales have been growing very rapidly in the last several years."
Figure 2
Usual YRBS respondents who smoked reported usually using some other way to obtain their cigarettes; by 2011, 13 percent were in the other category. Finally, there was increased reliance on taking from a store or family member. In 1995, 4.6 percent of state YRBS respondents who smoked reported that they usually took cigarettes from a store or family member; by 2011, 5.4 percent were in this category. Figure 3 , based on weighted national YRBS data, shows how young smokers usually obtained their cigarettes during the period 1995-2011. Again, the trends look similar to those in the state YRBS, adding to our confi dence that these two surveys captured the same broad infl uences.
IV. THE EMPIRICAL MODELS
We begin by using state YRBS data for the period 1995-2011 to estimate a logit model in which the probability that a respondent, i, smoked within 30 days of their interview is given by
Following Carpenter and Cook (2008) , the vector x i includes the cigarette tax in respondent i's state of residence and measures of race, sex, age, and grade. In addition, we control for the state unemployment rate and a variety of policies potentially correlated with cigarette taxes. Specifi cally, the vector x i includes an indicator for whether the state restricted access to cigarette vending machines, the minimum fi ne for underage smoking, and the minimum fi ne for selling cigarettes to an individual younger than the minimum legal purchase age (MLPA). 8 It also includes six clean indoor air law indicators. 9 Although previous studies have found mixed evidence with regard to whether youth access and clean air laws infl uence the smoking behavior of teenagers (Farkas et al., 2000; Lantz et al., 2000; Wakefi eld et al., 2000; Fichtenberg and Glantz, 2002; Klein et al., 2009; Tworeka et al., 2010) , we include them in the vector x i to ensure an unbiased estimate of the effect of taxes.
The model outlined above can easily be modifi ed to include state and year fi xed effects. State-specifi c linear time trends, which capture omitted factors at the state level that evolved at a constant rate such as anti-smoking sentiment, can also be included. As noted by DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios (2008, p. 909) , "[i]f public anti-smoking sentiment is itself an important determinant of smoking, failing to control for differences in anti-smoking sentiment across states will bias estimates towards fi nding stronger tax-responsiveness." 10 Next, we turn our attention to how youths usually obtained their cigarettes. Following Katzman, Markowitz, and McGeary (2007) , who focused on the decision to borrow versus buy, we examine the relationship between taxes and how youths obtained their cigarettes by estimating a multinomial logistic model of the form 1992-1993, 1995-1996, 1998-1999, 2000, 2001-2002, 2003, and 2006-2007. Estimates that included this measure in place of the state-specifi c linear time trends were similar to those reported below.
V. THE RESULTS
Regression results (marginal probabilities) are presented in Tables 2-4 . Standard errors corrected for clustering at the state level are reported in parentheses (Bertrand, Dufl o, and Mullainathan, 2004) . Following Carpenter and Cook (2008) , our focus is on estimating the impact of a one dollar increase in the cigarette tax.
A. Cigarette Taxes and Participation
The top panel of Table 2 presents estimates of the relationship between state cigarette taxes and smoking participation for the full sample. In addition to smoking participation, we examine two other outcomes: frequent smoking (equal to one if the respondent smoked 20 or more cigarettes in the past 30 days, and equal to zero otherwise), and everyday smoking (equal to one if the respondent smoked every day for the past 30 days, and equal to zero otherwise).
According to the baseline specifi cation in column (1), a one dollar increase in the cigarette tax is associated with a 21 percent (0.05/0.233) reduction in youth smoking participation, a 29 percent (0.032/0.110) reduction in frequent smoking, and a 31 percent (0.025/0.080) reduction in everyday smoking. These estimates are larger than those obtained by Carpenter and Cook (2008) using state YRBS data. However, Carpenter and Cook (2008) included state and year fi xed effects as controls. When we include state and year fi xed effects, our estimates are closer to theirs: a one dollar increase in the cigarette tax is associated with a 7 percent (0.016/0.233) reduction in youth smoking participation, a 10 percent (0.011/0.110) reduction in frequent smoking, and an 11 percent (0.009/0.080) reduction in everyday smoking. In comparison, using state YRBS data for the period 1993-2005, Carpenter and Cook (2008) found that a one dollar increase in the cigarette tax was associated with a 9 percent reduction in youth smoking participation and an 18 percent reduction in frequent smoking. 11 Adding statespecifi c linear time trends to the model reduces the absolute magnitude of our estimates still further, although they remain statistically signifi cant: a one dollar increase in the cigarette tax is associated with a 6 percent (0.013/0.233) reduction in youth smoking participation, a 7 percent (0.008/0.110) reduction in frequent smoking, and a 10 percent (0.008/0.080) reduction in everyday smoking. 12 The bottom panels of Table 2 separate respondents into two groups: those under age 18 (who were prohibited from purchasing cigarettes during the period under study), and those age 18 and older (who could legally buy cigarettes in all but a handful 11 Using data from the national YRBS for the period 1991-2005, Carpenter and Cook (2008) found that a one dollar increase in cigarette taxes was associated with a 20 percent reduction in youth smoking participation and a 30 percent reduction in frequent smoking. 12 Estimated effects of the control variables, although not reported, are available upon request. They provide consistent evidence that restricting smoking in restaurants and private schools reduces the probability of smoking participation. of states). 13 They provide evidence that younger respondents were less responsive to tax increases than older respondents. For instance, when the sample is restricted to respondents under age 18 and we control for state and year fi xed effects, a one dollar increase in cigarette taxes is associated with a 6 percent (0.014/0.222) reduction in smoking participation and an 11 percent (0.011/0.097) reduction in frequent smoking. In comparison, a one dollar increase in taxes is associated with an 11 percent (0.035/0.310) reduction in smoking participation and a 16 percent (0.027/0.165) reduction in frequent smoking among respondents age 18 and older. Although we cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated effects are the equal across the two age groups, previous studies have shown that experimental smokers, who typically rely on the secondary market, are less price sensitive than regular smokers (Emery, White, and Pierce, 2001; Liang and Chaloupka, 2002) . 14 Fully 63 percent of state YRBS respondents under age 18 who smoked usually obtained their cigarettes on the secondary market, while only 20 percent of older respondents who smoked usually obtained their cigarettes on the secondary market.
B. The Eff ect of Cigarette Taxes on the Formal versus the Secondary Market
The top panel of Table 3 presents estimates of (2) for the full sample. The omitted category is composed of non-smokers. The baseline specifi cation, shown in column (1), provides evidence that cigarette taxes are negatively related to participation in the formal market as well as participation in the secondary market: a one dollar increase in cigarette taxes is associated with a 22 percent (0.015/0.069) reduction in the probability of usually obtaining cigarettes directly from a commercial establishment or vending machine, and a 24 percent (0.032/0.131) reduction in the probability of obtaining cigarettes through borrowing or third-party purchase. However, when we include fi xed effects and state-specifi c linear time trends, these estimates become smaller in absolute magnitude and only the relationship between cigarette taxes and obtaining cigarettes through the secondary market remains statistically signifi cant at conventional levels: a one dollar increase in cigarette taxes is associated with a 5 percent (0.007/0.131) reduction in the probability of obtaining cigarettes through the secondary market. Controlling for state and year fi xed effects, there is little evidence that cigarette taxes are related to taking cigarettes or Other.
The bottom panels of Table 3 present estimates separating respondents into two groups: those under age 18 and those age 18 and older. They suggest that, among high school students too young to purchase cigarettes legally, cigarette taxes reduce smoking participation primarily through the secondary market. When the sample is restricted to respondents under age 18 (and controlling for year fi xed effects, state fi xed effects, and state-specifi c linear time trends), the estimated impact of a one dollar increase in the 13 The MLPA for cigarettes was 18 in all but fi ve states during the period 1995-2011. The MLPA was 19 in Alabama, Alaska, and Utah throughout this period. Although New Jersey increased its MLPA to 19 (from 18) in 2006 and Pennsylvania reduced its MLPA to 18 (from 21) in 2002, neither state contributed data to the current analysis. 14 Lillard, Molloy, and Sfekas (2013) found that, among individuals age13-17, the decision to initiate smoking was essentially unrelated to cigarette taxes. However, the probability of becoming a regular smoker was negatively related to taxes among those age 13-17. cigarette tax on obtaining cigarettes directly from commercial establishments or vending machines is small and statistically insignifi cant. In contrast, a one dollar increase in cigarette taxes is associated with a 6 percent (0.008/0.140) reduction in the probability of obtaining cigarettes through the secondary market. 15 The relationship between cigarette taxes and other methods of obtaining cigarettes is negative and statistically signifi cant in the baseline specifi cation and the specifi cation that includes state and year fi xed effects. However, the estimated relationship between cigarette taxes and Other loses signifi cance when we include the state-specifi c linear time trends. Among respondents age 18 years and older, who could legally buy cigarettes in all but a handful of states during the period under study, this pattern is reversed. A one dollar increase in cigarette taxes is associated with a 14 percent (0.032/0.231) reduction in the probability of obtaining cigarettes directly from a commercial establishment or vending machine, while the estimated relationship between cigarette taxes and obtaining cigarettes on the secondary market is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The relationship between cigarette taxes and taking from a store or a family member is negative and statistically signifi cant in the specifi cation with state and years fi xed effects. However, this estimate loses signifi cance when we include the state-specifi c linear time trends.
C. Decomposing the Formal and Secondary Markets
In this section, we decompose the formal and secondary markets into their constituent components, although borrowing and obtaining cigarettes from someone age 18 or older are still combined into one category. 16 The top panel of Table 4 presents the results for the full sample. Again, the omitted category is composed of non-smokers.
We fi nd that cigarette taxes are negatively related to usually obtaining cigarettes from a commercial establishment across all three specifi cations. Likewise, there is strong evidence that higher cigarette taxes reduce third-party purchases. In contrast, there is little evidence that cigarette taxes affect vending machine purchases, taking from a store/family member and Other, although it should be noted that only a small proportion of the sample reported using these methods to obtain cigarettes: 0.4 percent usually purchased cigarettes from a vending machine, 1.3 percent usually took cigarettes from a store/family member, and 2.3 percent used some other method to obtain cigarettes.
Table 4
Decomposing the Formal and Secondary Markets About 7 percent of the respondents usually obtained cigarettes through borrowing. The relationship between cigarette taxes and borrowing is insignifi cant except in the cross-section, a result that is consistent with the hypothesis that the pass-through rate is lower for borrowing than for third-party purchases. Whitesel and Shuman (2009) conducted in-depth interviews with self-identifi ed "social smokers." They concluded that bumming cigarettes typically involved "elaborate negotiations of exchange, even reciprocity" (Whitesal and Shuman, 2009, p. 336) . However, they noted that "participants can manipulate the system" and that the "norm of common courtesy is available to be exploited by people preying on the expectation of return for their gifts" (Whitesal and Shuman, 2009, p. 340 ). If borrowing a cigarette is tantamount to receiving a gift, then the lender would bear the full burden of any tax. 17 When we divide the sample based on age, we fi nd evidence that the relationship between cigarette taxes and smoking participation among high school students under age 18 is primarily driven by third-party purchases. 18 Also, the relationship between cigarette taxes and Other is negative and statistically signifi cant in the specifi cation with state and years fi xed effects. Among high school students age 18 and older, the relationship between cigarette taxes and participation is primarily driven by direct purchases from commercial establishments. The relationship between cigarette taxes and taking from a store or a family member is negative and statistically signifi cant in the specifi cation with state and years fi xed effects.
VI. CONCLUSION
Using state Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) data for the years 1995-2011, our empirical analysis begins by estimating the relationship between cigarette taxes and youth smoking participation. Like Carpenter and Cook (2008) , who analyzed state and national YRBS data, we fi nd strong evidence that this relationship is negative.
According to our preferred specifi cation, which includes state fi xed effects and statespecifi c linear time trends, a one dollar increase in the cigarette tax is associated with a 6 percent reduction in the probability of having smoked in the past 30 days. Given that the mean tax in our sample is 89 cents per pack (Table A2) , and that during the period under study taxes constituted 16.5 percent of the per-pack price, this reduction in smoking participation implies a tax elasticity of -0.05 and a price elasticity of -0.30. 19 17 Potential lenders could, however, respond to higher taxes by providing fewer cigarettes (Carpenter and Cook, 2008) . Hoek et al. (forthcoming) conducted in-depth interviews with young social smokers from New Zealand, some of whom reported "smoking to maintain their affi nity with others in the group and avoid rejecting a 'gift' that had value within the group." 18 When state-specifi c linear time trends are included, a one dollar increase in the cigarette tax is associated with a 0.011 decrease in the probability of smoking ( Table 2 ). Most of this decrease (0.006/0.011) can be ascribed to reduced third-party purchases. 19 To calculate this price elasticity, we assumed a tax pass through rate of 1.11. This was the tax pass through rate used by Carpenter and Cook (2008) and is based on estimates from Keeler et al. (1996) . Price information came from Orzechowski and Walker (2011). In comparison, Carpenter and Cook (2008) calculated a price elasticity of -0.56 using the national YRBS data, and a price elasticity of -0.25 using the state YRBS data. Our elasticity estimate is considerably lower than those produced by the fi rst generation of studies in this area, most of which were based on cross-sectional data (Lewit, Coate, and Grossman, 1981; Chaloupka and Grossman, 1996; Harris and Chan, 1998; Gruber and Zinman, 2001) . Nevertheless, policymakers interested in reducing youth smoking participation appear to have at least one effective weapon at their disposal. The remainder of our empirical analysis is devoted to an exploration of whether cigarette taxes affect how high school students usually obtain cigarettes. Most teenage smokers do not purchase their cigarettes directly from commercial establishments. Instead, they rely on secondary sources, borrowing or buying cigarettes from friends, family members, and strangers (Emery et al., 1999; DiFranza and Coleman, 2001; Forster et al., 2003; Croghan et al., 2003) .
To our knowledge, only one previous study has examined the relationship between taxes and how youths obtain cigarettes. Relying on cross-state variation for identification, Katzman, Markowitz, and McGeary (2007) found that taxes were negatively related to the probability of purchasing cigarettes but had little impact on borrowing. Because cigarette tax increases were larger in the 2000s than during the mid-to-late 1990s (Carpenter and Cook, 2008; Lillard, Molloy, and Sfekas, 2013) , and because we have more observations per state-year than were available to Katzman, Markowitz, and McGeary (2007) , we are able to control for state fi xed effects, state-specifi c linear time trends, as well as state-level anti-smoking policies such as whether access to vending machines was restricted.
We fi nd that, among high school students under age 18, cigarette taxes reduce smoking participation primarily through third-party purchases, an important component of the secondary market. This result suggests that sellers of cigarettes on the secondary market are able to pass price increases through to their customers, who respond by quitting or avoiding the habit altogether. Among older high school students, cigarette taxes reduce smoking participation principally through direct purchases from commercial establishments.
Finally, like Katzman, Markowitz, and McGeary (2007) , we fi nd that cigarette taxes are essentially unrelated to borrowing, a result in keeping with the argument that the secondary market insulates teenagers from anti-smoking policies (Friend et al., 2001; Ribisl, 2003) . We conclude that policymakers may have to look beyond raising cigarette taxes in order to reach teenage smokers who rely on borrowing to obtain cigarettes.
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Table A3
Borrowed and Adult Gave as Separate Categories
(1) (2)
All ages [N=333,336] Commercial 0.004 (0.004) -0.004 (0.002)* -0.004 (0.002)* Vending machine 0.002 (0.001)* 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) Third-party purchase -0.012 (0.002)*** -0.004 (0.002)** -0.005 (0.001)*** Borrowed -0.006 (0.002)*** 0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.005) Adult gave -0.004 (0.001)*** -0.002 (0.001)* -0.002 (0.001) Took 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) Other -0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) -0.003 (0.003)
Under 18 [N=291,694] Commercial -0.001 (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) Vending machine 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) Third-party purchase -0.014 (0.003)*** -0.004 (0.002)** -0.006 (0.002)*** Borrowed -0.007 (0.002)*** 0.001 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) Adult gave -0.004 (0.001)*** -0.002 (0.001)** -0.002 (0.002) Took 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) Other -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) -0.004 (0.003) 18 and above [N=41,642] Commercial -0.035 (0.011) *** -0.022 (0.010)** -0.024 (0.009)*** Vending machine 0.002 (0.0005) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) Third-party purchase 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) Borrowed -0.001 (0.002) 0.005 (0.004) -0.003 (0.005) Adult gave 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)** 0.001 (0.002) Took -0.001 (0.001) -0.004 (0.002)* -0.003 (0.003) Other 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.003 ( 
